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MEDICAID AND NEW FEDERALISM: THE
STATE OF INDIANA
Medicaid is a Federal grant-in-aid program which allows states to
enter into agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices to fund health care services for public assistance recipients and
specific categories of low income individuals and families;' it is the ma-
jor government health program which provides medical assistance to
poor individuals.
Since the program's inception in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, Medicaid expenditures have risen from $238 million in
19662 to present expenditures of $32.6 billion.3 The spiraling growth
and cost of Medicaid have placed an enormous burden upon both Fed-
eral and state budgets. It represents the single most rapidly rising item
in most state budgets, and many states have reduced other expenditures
to maintain their Medicaid program. 4
On July 30, 1981, President Reagan told the National Conference of
State Legislatures:
"This nation has never fully debated the fact that over the past 40 years
federalism - one of the most essential and underlying principles of
our Constitution-has nearly disappeared as a guiding force in Ameri-
can politics and government. My administration intends to initiate
such a debate .... 5
Mr. Reagan called for the implementation of New Federalism: a pro-
gram which would return $47 billion in Federal programs to state and
local government,6 while retaining other programs like Medicare.
Medicaid would be federalized and over forty categorical grant pro-
grams in other areas would be returned to the states for
administration.7
New Federalism has been shelved for the time being but Federal
cutbacks and the spiraling cost of Medicaid have forced states to
closely scrutinize their programs." The response of the state to Federal
cutbacks and higher Medicaid program costs raises many of the ques-
1. Grants to State for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
2. Medicare and Medicaid- Problems, Issues and Alternatives." Hearings Before Senate Commit-
tee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Medicare and Medicaid].
3. Anders, Federal Takeover of Medicaid Could Give Boost to Insurers, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1982,
at 43, col. 3. The states are paying approximately 40% of this amount.
4. Demkovich, For States Squeezed by Medicaid Costs, the Worst Crunch is Stilto Come, NAT'L
J., Jan. 10, 1981, at 48.
5. President Reagan, Address before the National Conference of States Legislatures in Atlanta,
Georgia, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 833 (Aug. 3, 1981).
6. President Reagan, State of the Union Address, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 80 (Feb. 1,
1982).
7. Borfield, New Federalism: The Debate is On, J. INST. SOCIOECON. STUD. 19 (1982).
8. The Reagan Administration has suspended its efforts to write legislation transferring welfare
and food stamps programs to the states in exchange for a federal assumption of all Medicaid
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tions which New Federalism will raise, and an examination of how the
state responds to Federal cutbacks may suggest how states will react to
the implementation of New Federalism. This paper analyzes how one
state, Indiana, has responded to Medicaid cutbacks.
The Medicaid Program: An Overview
In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act of 1935 to in-
clude grants to states for medical assistance programs.9 Unlike Medi-
care which is available as a matter of right to all retired individuals
who paid Social Security taxes,' 0 Medicaid stems from public welfare
concerns and focuses upon specific low income groups.
The report of the Committee on Ways and Means notes:
"a state [Medicaid] plan to be approved must include provisions for
medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or assistance under
state plans approved under Titles I, IV, IX, XIV, and XXI [of the So-
cial Security Act]. The people who are eligible for assistance under
these titles are the most needy and it is appropriate for their medical
costs to be met. Thus, poor people will have the first call on the re-
sources of the state, and only after these individuals are provided for
may states provide medical assistance to the less needy."
Medicaid is a program of matching funds for state plans approved
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.' 2 Federal funds are
available contingent upon the state's per capita income and range from
50 to 77.5% of the state program costs. All states as well as the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Northern Marianas partici-
pate in the program.'
3
Medicaid is a program of "statutory provisions and HEW regula-
tions of labyrinthine complexity."' 4 Congress desired to provide states
with flexibility in the design and implementation of their programs.' 5
Thus state programs differ substantially in eligibility criteria and serv-
ices provided. Additionally, since the Federal government pays a sub-
stantial portion of state Medicaid costs, it subjects state programs to
substantial Federal regulation, particularly regarding the curtailment
costs. The transfer is at the heart of President Reagan's new federalism initiative. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
9. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
10. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH CARE FINANCING PROGRAM STATIS-
TICS 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HFCA STATISTICS].
I. H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 66, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2017.
12. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (1976). When the author uses the term matching funds, the author refers to
federal financial participation in the Medicaid program. Federal expenditures vary with the
state's per capita income and currently range from 50% to 77.55% of program medical ex-
penditures. HCFA STATISTICS, supra note 10, at 2.
13. Arizona which has never had a Medicaid program, opted to participate as of October 1, 1982.
Id.
14. Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1976).
15. States have great flexibility in determining eligibility, services, and the scope of services,
within the federal guidelines. Courts have traditionally been very respectful of this flex-
ibiity. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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of services. 16
Federal regulations mandate that a state program must provide
medical assistance to specific groups of individuals. 7 At a minimum,
the state must assist the categorically needy,'8 individuals eligible for
cash assistance under AFDC or blind or disabled individuals meeting
the income and resource levels for supplemental security income eligi-
bility.' 9 Federal regulations also require that state Medicaid programs
provide at least certain services to the categorically needy: In and Out-
patient hospital service; rural health clinic services; other laboratory
and X-ray services; skilled nursing facility services for individuals
twenty-one or older; early and periodic screening of diagnosis and
treatment; family planning services and supplies; physician services;
and home health services.2 0 States also may offer a comprehensive list
of services to both the categorically and the medically needy for which
federal funds are available.2"
States may extend Medicaid to the medically needy,22 individuals
who meet all criteria for categorically needy assistance with the excep-
tion of income, and who have substantial medical bills. 3 Federal regu-
lations allow states to include a spenddown provision in their Medicaid
programs covering individuals who do not meet the categorically needy
income levels but whose medical bills effectively reduce their income to
the categorically needy threshold. 4
16. States will often attempt to implement cutbacks without following federal notice require-
ments. The courts respond by enjoining the cutbacks until the notice provisions are properly
complied with. See, e.g., Claus v. Smith, 519 F.Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Kimble v. Solo-
mon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Becker v. Toia, 439 F.Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1-1011 (1979).
18. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.100-135 (1979).
19. Id.
20. 42 C.F.R. § 440.210 (1979).
21. Federal regulations provide that the state may make available a broad range of services: a)
inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental
disease) and rural health clinic services; b) outpatient hospital services; c) other laboratory
and X-ray services; d) skilled nursing facility services; e) early and periodic screening, diag-
nosis and treatment (EPSDT); f) family planning services; g) physician's services; h) medical
care or other remedial care recognized by state law furnished by licensed practitioners within
the scope of their practice as defined by state law; i) home health care services; j) private duty
nursing services; k) clinic services; 1) dental services; m) physical therapy, related services; n)
prescribed drugs, dentures and prosthetic devices and eyeglasses prescribed by a physician
skilled in diseases of the eye; o) any other diagnostic, screening, preventive and rehabilitative
services; p) inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services and intermediate care
facilities for individuals 65 years or older in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases;
q) intermediate care facility services (other than institutional services for mental disease or
tuberculosis) for individuals who are determined. . . to be in need of such care; r) inpatient
psychiatric hospital services for individuals under age 21 .... ; s) any other medical care and
any other type of remedial care recognized under state law specified by the secretary. 42
U.S.C. § 1396d (1974).
22. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.300-.325 (1979). Financial eligibility for the medically needy varies from
program to program, ranging from a high of $6,552 per year in Hawaii, to a low of$1,512 per
year in Puerto Rico, for a family of four. HCFA STATisTics, supra note 10, at Table 4.2.
23. Id. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.300-.325 (1979). See also HCFA STATISTICS, supra not 10, at 65.
24. State programs often provide Medicaid coverage to other needy groups, such as individuals
eligible for a state administered welfare program. However, federal funds are not available
to cover these individuals.
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Congress recently amended the Social Security Act to allow states
substantially more freedom in selecting the services provided to the
medically needy.25 The new regulations enable a state to offer services
to the medically needy without regard for requirements as to a mini-
mum number of services, or a mix of institutional and non-institutional
services. States may offer services to one group of individuals, such as
the elderly, without being required to offer comparable services to
other groups. The 1981 amendments intend to provide states with flex-
ibility in establishing eligibility criteria and the scope of services pro-
vided under the medically needy program.26 This flexibility allows
states to attune their medically needy programs to the needs of various
population groups.2 7
Federal regulations also mandate the degree and scope of other
non-medical services that must be provided. 8 Each service under the
state plan must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reason-
ably achieve its purpose.2 9 The state Medicaid plan may not deny or
reduce services in amount or scope merely because of the diagnosis,
type of illness or condition.3"
States may implement appropriate limitations, however, based
upon criteria of medical necessity or overutilization of medical serv-
ices.3" States often use this provision to limit the number of days of
hospitalization for which it will reimburse a recipient. Despite the Fed-
eral regulations, differences in the state eligibility requirements and the
scope of services offered produce substantial variations among state
Medicaid programs.
25. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2171-2172, 95 Stat. 807
(1981). Previously, state plans providing services to the medically needy had to insure that
the state program offered the mandatory services for the categorically needy, or any seven of
the medical services offered under the Medicaid program. If the state plan opted to cover
inpatient hospital services or skilled nursing facility services, physician services for individu-
als undergoing such treatment had to be included. 42 C.F.R. § 440 (1979).
26. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SUMMARY OF FINANCE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, SO-
CIAL SECURITY PROVISIONS, S. REP. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 427, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 697-98.
27. Congress did, however, establish specific restrictions. A state which does offer medically
needy services must provide ambulatory services to children and prenatal and delivery serv-
ice for pregnant women. Where a state provides institutional services to any medically needy
group, it must provide ambulatory services for the same. Finally, if the state Medicaid pro-
gram covers the mentally retarded in intermediate care facilities, it must provide all services
required prior to the 1981 amendment to medically needy individuals. See supra note 22.
28. 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (1979). "Provider" means any individual or entity furnishing Medicaid
services under a provider agreement with a Medicaid agency, 42 C.F.R. § 430.1 (1979).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1979).
30. Id.
31. The case of Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), is interesting in this regard. Medicaid recipi-
ents brought an action challenging the denial of coverage for non-therapeutic abortions. The
Supreme Court noted that nothing in the Medicaid statute suggests that states are required to
fund every medical procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical care.
The court noted that states were given broad discretion in determining the extent of medical
care, provided that such assistance be "reasonable" and "consistent with the objectives of the





When Congress considered implementing the Medicaid program,
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare3 2 estimated that
Medicaid would cost the government $238 million in its first year of
operation.33 Current expenditures are estimated to reach $32.6 bil-
lion.3 4 This spiraling cost has created the Medicaid crisis.
Between 1967 and 1976, the Medicaid program grew rapidly. Tile
six states which implemented Medicaid programs in 1967 spent the en-
tire $238 million allocated to Medicaid by HEW as first year costs.
36
President Johnson's 1968 budget allocated $4.24 billion as the Federal
share for forty-eight state Medicaid programs. 7 Only 37 states were
able to implement Medicaid programs-at a cost exceeding $3.54 bil-
lion.38 The number of recipients doubled from 11.5 million in 1967 to
almost 23 million in 1977.
39
Since 1977, slow growth and substantial coverage changes have
characterized the program.4° The number of Medicaid recipients has
declined at an annual rate of 3.1% since peaking in 1977. Costs have
continued to spiral, nonetheless, from $16,277,000 in 1977, to
$20,474,000 in 1979.41 Two factors account for the current Medicaid
crisis: increasing coverage of long term institutional care and state
fiscal difficulties.
In 1979, 42.3% of Medicaid reimbursements covered nursing home
costs and an additional 31.4% covered hospitalization costs. 42 Nearly
three-fourths of the Medicaid budget, therefore, paid for institutional
care. Institutional care represents the costliest sector of health care,
generally.43 State fiscal difficulties compound the Medicaid crisis.
During a recession, states have less revenue available but face an in-
creasing demand upon state welfare services from the seasonally and
permanently unemployed. As Medicaid program costs outgrow avail-
able state revenues, and as the Federal government reduces matching
funds, state budgets become increasingly strained.
32. HEW is now known as the Department of Health and Human Services.
33. See Medicare and Medicaid, supra note 2, at 42.
34. See Anders, supra note 3.
35. An analysis of private sector health costs indicates that the spiraling cost of Medicaid is
symptomatic of the health care industry in general. Hospital costs have soared from $3.9
billion in 1950 to $76 billion in 1978, an average annual increase of 11.2%. Nursing home
expenditures have risen at an annual rate of 17.2%. While the consumer price index rose
87% for all items from 1970-1979, medical care service charges rose 200% over the same
period. DEP'T OF HEW, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 181 (1979).




40. HCFA STATISTICS, supra note 10, at Table 2.1.
41. Id. In 1978, this figure dropped by 700,000 to 22,197,000, and the following year fell to
21,540,000.
42. Id. at Figure 1.1.
43. Roemer, Hopkins & Gartside, Copayments for 4mbulatory Care: Penny- Wise and Pound
Foolish, 13 MEDICAL CARE 457 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Roemer].
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Cutbacks on the Federal Level
Since October 1981, the poor and the near poor have lost more than
$10 billion in Federal support.' Many of the cutbacks have been in
the area of health care, particularly Medicare and Medicaid. The
House-Senate Conference Committee on Medicare and Medicaid
agreed to nearly $14.3 billion in cuts in those programs alone,45 most of
which impact on lower income individuals.
The federal government acted to alleviate the Medicaid crisis in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Reconciliation Act),4 6
and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).
47
First, Congress has imposed much of the increasing cost of Medicaid
directly upon state budgets. Second, Congress created various incen-
tives and reformed present laws to make Medicaid a more cost-effective
program.
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Congress in-
creased state Medicaid costs by reducing federal funding:48 by 3% in
fiscal year 1982, 4% in 1983, and 4 1/2% in 1984.49 The reduction
would be adjusted upward by one percent for each of three
contingencies:
1) an unemployment rate of at least 150% of the national average;
2) currently existing state hospital rate review programs; and
3) documented reductions in state Medicaid expenditures which
equal one percent of the federal funds available to the state, pro-
vided that the reduction is due to third party, fraud and abuse
recoveries.5 °
This provision directly imposes the brunt of increasing Medicaid
costs upon already heavily burdened state budgets. Since most states
find it increasingly difficult to cope with the increasing cost of Medi-
caid, a shell game begins at the state and local levels to determine who
will ultimately bear the costs.
51
44. "Since last October, the poor and near poor in America have lost more than $10 billion in
federal support. Some 661,000 children have lost Medicaid coverage; 900,000 poor young-
sters no longer receive free or reduced-price school lunches; 280,000 no longer receive free or
reduced-price breakfasts; 150,000 poor working families have lost eligibility for government-
supported day care, 200,000 fewer pregnant women, new mothers, infants, and children are
getting special federal coupons for milk, juice, and other diet supplements. One million peo-
ple have been dropped from the food stamp rolls. In addition, 890 school districts have cut
back on spEcial education programs." Reich, Ideologies of Survival, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
27, 1982.
45. K. GLENN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1 (Aug. 16, 1982).
46. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
47. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 131-150, 96 Stat.
367 (1982).
48. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2161, 95 Stat. 803 (1981).
49. Id.
50. Id. This effectively assists states with high employment in the one instance, but encourages
states to be fiscally prudent in the other.
51. It appears very unlikely state and local governments will be able to make up for the loss of
federal funds in the immediate future. Certainly, it is even less likely that private contribu-
tions from the business community, churches, or the United Way will be large enough to fill
the gaps. Many existing agencies, programs, and services are likely to be eliminated. Most
19831
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The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 enormously
expanded the ability of a state to impose cost-sharing upon Medicaid
recipients.52 Under the previous law, a state could impose cost-sharing
upon all services received by the medically needy, but only upon op-
tional services provided to the categorically needy.53 TEFRA allows
copayments upon virtually all services to Medicaid recipients.54
Copayments reduce state program costs in two respects: by the amount
of the copayment, and by a financial disincentive to the recipients' use
of services. The TEFRA Conference Committee estimated that copay-
ments could reduce state expenditures by $45 million in fiscal year
1985."
Both the Reconciliation Act and TEFRA also provide incentives to
render state Medicaid programs more effective. By making state Medi-
caid programs more cost-conscious and cost-effective, the Federal gov-
ernment hopes to reduce or stabilize its Medicaid costs. The
Reconciliation Act allows states to waive administrative requirements,
such as the recipient's freedom of choice of provider56, or statewide
uniformity57 of programs where the waiver is in the context of specific
programs designed to make the state Medicaid program more effective.
For example, the state may purchase laboratory or medical services
through competitive bidding; limit or suspend a provider whom the
state determines has provided more services than necessary; limit or
suspend a provider not meeting professionally recognized health stan-
dards; or restrict or "lock in" Medicaid recipients who have overu-
tilized services. 8
other programs will be reduced in size. Eligibility criteria will be tightened for many pro-
grams limiting service to only the most needy. Services such as research, demonstration,
program evaluation, and training programs will also be severely curtailed. Everywhere there
will be intense competition for available funds. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL WEL-
FARE, THE ROLE OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE, 8-9 (1982).
52. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 131.
53. 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1979).
54. There are specific limitations, however. Copayments may not be imposed, inter alia, upon
pregnancy services, patients in significant and intermediate care facilities, emergency services
and family planning services.
55. See supra note 4.
56. Congress imposed the freedom of choice requirement upon state Medicaid programs to in-
sure that Medicaid recipients would receive the same level and quality of care the private
patient receives.
57. Federal regulations mandate that a state Medicaid program provide uniform standards of
care and levels of service throughout the state. However, waiver of the state uniformity
requirement is intended to allow the states to try experimental programs without being re-
quired to implement such programs nationwide.
58. The Secretary is given waiver authority to allow states to restrict providers from whom a
recipient can obtain services (other than emergency services) so long as: 1) the providers
comply with reimbursement, quality and utilization standards under the state plan; 2) the
restrictions are consistent with access, quality, and efficient and economic provision of care
and services; and 3) the restrictions do not discriminate among classes of providers on
grounds unrelated to their demonstrated effectiveness and efficiency; implement a case man-
agement system or speciality physician services arrangement which restricts the provider
through whom recipients can obtain primary care services; share savings of cost-effective
medical care with recipients through expanded service coverage; and allow localities to act as
central brokers in assisting recipients in selecting among competing health care plans. B.
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Additionally, the Reconciliation Act amended the list of services
which states must provide to the medically needy. 9 Under previous
law, a state which chose to cover the medically needy had to cover
them all, offer the same or similar services to all recipients, and provide
as a minimum a combination of institutional and non-institutional
services." The present law allows a state substantially more freedom
to determine whom they shall cover and to what extent. States may
offer services to one group of individuals, such as the elderly, without
offering comparable services to other groups. Essentially, states may
attune their medically needy programs to address the specific needs of
different population groups.
61
Finally, other provisions in the Reconciliation Act encourage states
to seek alternatives to expensive institutional care.62 The Secretary of
HHS may waive federal requirements and enable a state to cover home
or community based care for individuals who might otherwise need
institutional care.63 The Act also provides for increased flexibility in
the use of Health Maintenance Organizations 6a and adds increased
flexibility to the manner in which states may reimburse hospitals.65
THE STATE OF INDIANA
In response to the problem of funding the Medicaid program, Indi-
ana has implemented a variety of new provisions to make Medicaid
more cost-effective. Indiana also has imposed the increasing cost of
Medicaid upon the recipient through copayments and by tightening eli-
gibility rules.
Cost Control
Indiana's cost control program focuses on the reduction of the un-
necessary use of Medicaid services by insuring that Medicaid recipients
receive only necessary and appropriate services. Utilization control is
one of the best options available to states for reducing Medicaid costs.
One commentator for the Urban Institute has noted that
[i]t is not surprising that utilization control is considered a primary ele-
ment in Medicaid cost containment policy, for it appears to offer some-
SPITZ, STATE GUIDE TO MEDICAID COST CONTAINMENT, App. A 67 (1981).[hereinafter cited
as STATE GUIDE]
59. See supra note 46, at § 2171.
60. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.300-.325 (1979).
61. Congress did, however, establish specific restrictions. A state which does offer medically
needy services must provide ambulatory services to children, and prenatal and delivery serv-
ices for pregnant women. Where a state provides institutional services for any medically
needy group, it must provide ambulatory services for the same. Finally, if the state Medicaid
program covers mentally retarded individuals in intermediate care facilities, it must provide
all the services required prior to the 1981 amendments to medically needy individuals. Pub.
L. No. 97-35, §§ 2171-2172 (1981).
62. Id.
63. Id.




thing for nothing. Unlike benefit limitations or restrictions on
eligibility, the client need not suffer any real reduction in program ben-
efits if the control mechanism is properly administered. Likewise, a
utilization control need not result in lower levels of remuneration per
service to medical providers, at least not for those who meet the pro-
gram's standards for medical necessity. 6
Indiana has implemented four programs which effectively control costs:
lock-ins; prior authorization; third party liability recovery; and fraud
control.
Lock-ins
Under a lock-in program, a recipient is limited to receiving services
from a specific doctor or pharmacist.67 The Medicaid Management In-
formation Service (MMIS), a federal computer system, enables states to
identify the profligate use of Medicaid services by specific individu-
als.68 The state may then contact the individual through the local wel-
fare office to determine the actual need for services. If the need cannot
be verified, the state notes this on the recipient's Medicaid card and
then allows that individual to receive services only from specific prov-
iders.69 This lock-in program effectively precludes the recipient from
obtaining identical prescriptions from several pharmacists, or going to
several physicians with the same problem.7" As a result, lock-ins re-
move the Medicaid recipient's freedom to choose the physician or other
provider.71 The Reconciliation Act expressly allows states to waive the
freedom of choice requirement upon finding individual cases of
abuse.72
Indiana's lock-in program while new and untested, promises sub-
stantial savings to the state. Missouri, for example, has implemented a
very effective program 73 which saves their Medicaid program approxi-
mately $1.82 million per year.74
Prior authorization
Indiana also has acted to control costs through a prior authorization
program.75 This program requires a Medicaid recipient to receive ap-
proval from a medical review team prior to receiving specified medical
66. B. STUART, Utilization Controls 29 (The Urban Institute, Medicaid Cost Containment Series,
Vol. 3, June, 1977).
67. STATE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 22.
68. See generally, D. Chavkin,,4n Introduction to the Medicaid Management Information System
(MMIS), or Your Friend, The Computer, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 99 (1978).
69. 470 INDIANA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 5-1-2, reprinted in 5 INDIANA REGISTER, No. 8, at
1699 (Aug. 1, 1982).
70. STATE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 29-30.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 48, at § 2175.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See STATE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28.
[Vol. 10:532
Medicaid and New Federalism
services.76 The state acts as the final arbiter of medical need by deny-
ing payment for services it determines unnecessary."
The prior authorization program can be very effective if properly
implemented. It would be administratively impossible for the state to
subject every service to review before delivery.7" Certain services
which are costly or are likely to be overused, however, merit prior au-
thorization by an impartial medical review team. Prior authorization
delays delivery of services to the recipient and increases administration
and paperwork for the state.79 Therefore, prior authorization is most
effective for those services for which the state anticipates a high rate of
non-confirmation. 0
Indiana's comprehensive prior authorization program requires
prior approval of many overutilized services. Generally physician
services, pharmacy services, and in- and out-patient hospital services
do not require prior authorization.8' Indiana provides exceptions to
prior authorization, for example, for special surgical procedures where
the state anticipates a high rate of non-confirmation by the review
board, such as requests for sex change operations, face lifts, reconstruc-
tive or plastic surgery, and weight reduction surgery." Prior authoriza-
tion is required, also, for many of the optional services Indiana makes
available under its Medicaid program, such as dentistry, physical, oc-
cupational or speech therapy, audiology, podiatry, optometry, and
mental health services.83 All hearing aid purchases and repairs must
receive prior approval by the state.8"
The Medical Review Board determines on a case by case basis
whether to allow services based upon criteria of medical reasonableness
and necessity. Prior authorization is not required in an emergency
situation. 6 To reduce the administrative delay of prior authorization,
services are deemed authorized if the Department of Public Welfare
does not come to a decision within ten days of receipt of all necessary
information. 7 The state regulations grant an appeal for cases denied
by the state. 8
Indiana also uses prior authorization to limit admission to nursing






81. 470 INDIANA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 5-6 reprinted in INDIANA REGISTER, No. 1 at 32
(Jan. 1, 1982).
82. Id. at §§ 5-6-2(b), reprinted in 5 INDIANA REGISTER, No. 1, at 49 (Jan. 1, 1982).
83. 1d. at §§ 5-6, reprinted in 5 INDIANA REGISTER, No. 1, at 47 (Jan. 1, 1982).
84. Id. at § 5-6-9.




89. Id. at §§ 5-6-17.
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Medicaid covers, and occupies an increasingly larger share of the state
Medicaid dollar. By reducing institutional care costs, a state may sub-
stantially reduce its Medicaid bill. Prior authorization of admission to
nursing homes limits admission to nursing homes to individuals who
are truly in need of institutional care. It reflects a state policy of pro-
viding health care in the most appropriate, yet least expensive
environment. 90
Third party liability recovery. Indiana has also implemented an ef-
fective third party liability program which recoups Medicaid costs for
which third parties are liable.9 Federal regulations require a state to
determine the legal liability of third parties for services provided under
the state Medicaid program and to seek reimbursement from them.92
Third parties may include insurance companies, other federal and state
programs, such as the Veteran's Administration, CHAMPUS, Medi-
care and private tortfeasors.93 The state's failure to recoup third party
costs consequently subsidizes private insurance companies and other
public agencies at the state taxpayer's expense.
Indiana prevents the subsidization of insurance companies by
prohibiting them from writing policies which limit or exclude payments
to Medicaid recipients.94 The private insurer, therefore, not the state
Medicaid program, bears the cost of the Medicaid recipient's treatment.
Where a recipient has received Medicaid services covered under an in-
surance policy, the insurer must reimburse the state for the services
provided.95 Indiana law gives the State Department of Public Welfare
a lien on behalf of any Medicaid recipient injured, or suffering an ill-
ness or disease through the negligence of another individual.9 6 The
State Department of Public Welfare has rights of assignment and sub-
rogation of Medicaid recipient claims against third parties.97
Third party liability programs control costs not only through utili-
zation control but also through reducing the subsidization of other
agencies by the state Medicaid program. Properly managed, such pro-
grams can recoup many times their administrative cost. Minnesota im-
plemented a program very similar to Indiana's which recovered nine
million dollars with an initial investment of $263,000.98
Fraud control. As of July 1, 1982, Indiana has also implemented an
effective fraud control program to prevent abuse in its Medicaid pro-
gram.99 Federal law mandates that states implement fraud control pro-
90. See supra note 65.
91. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-1-7-24.6 (Bums Supp. 1982). See also, 470 LA.C §§ 5-1-13, reprinted
in 5 INDIANA REGISTER, No. 7 (July 1, 1982).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 433.135 (1979).
93. STATE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 48.
94. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-1-7-24.4 (Bums Supp. 1982).
95. Id. at § 12-1-7-24.2.
96. Id. at § 12-1-7-24.6.
97. Id.
98. STATE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 48.
99. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-10-1 (BURNS Supp. 1982).
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grams "to investigate and prosecute all aspects of the provision of
medical assistance [Medicaid] and the activities of providers of such
assistance under the state plan."'1
Various studies demonstrate that there is little direct incentive to
states to implement fraud control units because these units are expen-
sive and yield a poor return on the money invested in them. A recent
General Accounting Office study of seven state fraud control units
found that these units recovered less than fifty cents per dollar invested
in them.'' However, fraud control units have a clear deterrent effect
which cannot be measured in terms of dollars.102
To enhance the deterrent effect, states should enact clearly defined
civil and criminal penalties against fraudulent Medicaid recipients and
providers. Providers of Medicaid services are particularly susceptible
to deterrence under traditional theories.0 3 Indiana recently strength-
ened laws which provide strong penalties against Medicaid providers
who abuse the Medicaid program. These sanctions include: denial of
payment for services rendered during a specific period, rejection of a
prospective provider's application for assistance, removal of a pro-
vider's certificate to participate in the Medicaid program, assessment of
interest charges accruing from the date of overpayment, and fines
against the provider not exceeding three times the amount of the over-
payment.'° The state may deny payment to providers under a variety
of circumstances including when the Department of Public Welfare
finds that the service claims were not in fact provided, were not medi-
cally reasonable and necessary, or were otherwise fraudulently ob-
tained. 0 5 Overpayments may be deducted from subsequent payments
to that provider."°
Fraud control serves as a very effective deterrent where the State
Department of Public Welfare has sufficient authority to pursue and
penalize fraud. Fraud control reduces program costs by punishing in-
dividuals who wrongfully exploit the program, not by reducing services
to'individuals in need.
Copayments
Indiana took a second step to combat the spiraling cost of Medicaid
by reducing the level of services provided under its Medicaid program.
Initially, Indiana implemented copayments-the requirement that
Medicaid recipients pay a portion of the cost of their medical serv-
ices. 107 Federal law mandates that copayments be nominal and, at the
100. 42 C.F.R. § 455-12 (1979).
101. STATE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 30.
102. Id.
103. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1972).
104. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-1-7-15.3 (Burns Supp. 1982).
105. Id. at § 12-1-7-15.7.
106. Id. at § 12-1-7-15.9.
107. See generally, 42 C.F.R. § 447.50 (1979).
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time Indiana implemented its Medicaid program, copayments could
only be imposed upon non-mandatory services available to the categor-
ically needy.1" 8 Indiana imposed the maximum copayment allowable
under the Federal regulations.109
Indiana's copayment program was enjoined on procedural grounds,
however, in a lawsuit filed by the Legal Services Corporation. In Claus
v. Smith,"' the district court for the Northern District of Indiana found
that the copayment plan as implemented by the state of Indiana vio-
lated both federal and state notice requirements. Although Indiana has
subsequently complied with the Federal and state requirements, the
state has taken no action to reinstate copayments.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act broadened the scope
of copayments which states may implement. I I I States may now impose
nominal copayments on all Medicaid recipients including the categori-
cally needy. Congress specifically exempted from the copayment re-
quirement, however, services furnished to individuals under eighteen
years of age, pregnancy and prenatal services, some institutional care
services and emergency services.11 2 Indiana has not yet indicated
whether they intend to implement a copayment pursuant to the new
federal regulations.
Copayments, while deceptively attractive, provide an ineffective so-
lution for states burdened with rising Medicaid costs." 3 Indiana hoped
the copayment program would reduce costs in two respects: first, the
copayment the recipient pays reduces the cost the state has to bear; and
second, copayments impose a financial disincentive upon the recipient,
thus deterring the use of medical services. 4 The amount of money the
state hopes to save through the copayment itself is minor. By deterring
the use of medical services by the recipient, however, the state hopes to
substantially reduce Medicaid costs.
Unfortunately, copayments, do not deter the overutilization of med-
ical services. Physicians, not consumers, determine the need for most
medical services. 15 Imposing copayments on physician ordered serv-
ices does not deter the overutilization of services: it deters the neces-
sary use of services. Copayments apply equally to necessary as well as
unnecessary services. 116
108. 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1979).
109. 42 C.F.R. § 447.54(2), (3) (1979).
110. 519 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ind. 1980). The State of Indiana specifically did not comply with 42
C.F.R. § 447-205 (1979), 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.206, .210, .220 (1979), as well as IND. CODE ANN.
§ 4-22-2-4 (1981).
111. See supra note 47, at § 131.
112. Id. at § 1916(A)(B)(C)(D).
113. See generally Note, Medicaid Copayments, .4 Bitter Pillfor the Poor, 10 J. LEGIS. 213 (1982).
114. See generally STATE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 25.
115. NAT. COMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE 291 (1981).
Physician decisions on behalf of patients were responsible for $154 billion in medical ex-
penditures as of 1980.
116. Roemer, supra note 43, at 458.
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Second, two major studies suggest that copayments ultimately cost a
state more than they save." l7 While copayments may initially reduce
state expenditures for ambulatory care, ultimately, non-ambulatory
care costs increase. Dr. Milton Roemer who conducted a study on the
effect of copayments on utilization levels, notes:
These findings suggest that the effects of copayment requirements
for ambulatory services (and prescriptions) in a medical care program
for low-income families were to exert a deterrent effect on demand or
utilization. The inhibiting effect applied to office visits-the bedrock
of general medical care-and also to typical diagnostic tests
(urinalyses), to preventive procedures (Pap smears), and to drug pre-
scriptions. Easy access to and use of general ambulatory doctors' serv-
ices are widely considered to have preventative value, by permitting
prompt diagnosis and treatment of an illness before it becomes more
serious.
When such ambulatory services are inhibited, it would seem that a
price is paid-namely, a rise in the relative rate of hospitalization. It is
likely that this elevated hospitalization rate is due to the postponement
of ambulatory care, so that when the patient is finally driven to seek
assistance, his case is more advanced and requires inpatient care.' 8
Dr. Roemer suggests that copayment ultimately increases a state
Medicaid bill by deterring preventive care and care for an illness at an
early stage." 9 Copayments deter recipients from seeking care until
their illnesses advance and require more expensive and extensive care.
"Copayments," Roemer states, "are penny-wise and pound-foolish." 20
Copayments impact more seriously upon the elderly, the chronical-
ly ill and those with large families-those individuals who are likely to
need a large amount of medical assistance and with little or no discre-
tionary income. While copayments may be nominal to middle-class
individuals, they impose a severe financial burden upon Medicaid re-
cipients, particularly where the recipient needs a variety of services.'
2'
In Claus, one of the plaintiffs with minimal resources needed so many
services that she had a monthly copayment bill of $45.50. 122
Indiana also has cut back on Medicaid spending by freezing eligi-
bility levels so as to exclude many Medicaid recipients who receive
Supplemental Security Income (S.S.I.).123 S.S.I. recipients receive an-
117. See generally M. ROEMER, L. HELMS, H. NEWHOUSE, C. PHELPS, COPAYMENTS AND DE-
MAND FOR MEDICAL CARE: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE (1978). There is a recent Rand
Corporation study which suggests that copayments reduce medical utilization without a con-
comitant increase in institutional or non-ambulatory care costs. However, only 5% of the
study's participants were Medicaid recipients and the study focused mainly on cost sharing
in a lower middle-class environment.
118. Roemer, supra note 43, at 464-65.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 457.
121. Telephone interview with Gerald Riley, Director of the State of Washington Medical Assist-
ance Program (Aug. 19, 1982).
122. Claus v. Smith, 519 F.Supp. 820 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
123. Telephone interview with Greg French, Director of the Older Adult Impact Program, and
Attorney for the Legal Services Program of Northern Indiana (Oct. 22, 1982).
1983]
Journal of Legislation
nual cost of living increases. Indiana has frozen their Medicaid eligi-
bility levels, precluding many S.S.I. recipients from eligibility for
Indiana Medicaid benefits in Indiana.
24
To alleviate the hardship these freezes create, federal regulations
mandate that S.S.I. recipients be allowed to "spend down" from their
present income level until they reach Indiana eligibility levels, and thus
qualify for Medicaid.125 If an S.S.I. recipient's income is five dollars
above the Indiana eligibility levels, the recipient is eligible for Medi-
caid when he has incurred five dollars worth of medical bills paid from
his own pocket.
Requiring Medicaid recipients to spend their cost-of-living increase
to be eligible for Medicaid subsidizes the state Medicaid program at the
expense of the S.S.I. recipient. Imposing the increasing cost of Medi-
caid upon the Medicaid recipient is a poor policy choice because it im-
poses the cost of medical services upon individuals with no
discretionary income. These are also the individuals who can least af-
ford the increased costs. S.S.I. recipients must now choose between
food, rent and other necessary services, or medical care.'
26
Additionally, causing recipients to delay or go without necessary
health care not a sound fiscal policy.'27 Many illnesses may be cured
quickly and inexpensively if treated early. Delaying health care until
it may only be provided in a more expensive environment in the long
run will increase Medicaid costs. The human cost in terms of pain and
suffering cannot be estimated.
LOCAL LEVEL
Cutbacks on the Federal and state level ultimately appear at the
local level. Localities, however, do not have the revenue-raising capa-
bilities of the state and federal governments. States should not adopt a
policy which may lead to a shift of the financial burden of public health
programs from the state to counties and cities.' 2
The immediate effect of shifting health costs to the local level pro-
grams is twofold: Medicaid recipients make greater demands upon the
local level, thus stretching an already tight local budget evenitighter, 129
and, moreover, to the extent that the locality is unwilling or unable to
fund Medicaid services for local recipients, such individuals must go
without needed health care.' 30 When states reduce their Medicaid pro-
gram, the ultimate loser is the recipient who must often choose between
food and housing, or medical services. Localities are simply incapable
124. Id.
125. 42 C.F.R. § 435.731 (1979).
126. Telephone Interview, supra note 123.
127. See generally Roemer, supra note 43.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Telephone interview, supra note 123.
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of responding to the additional burden of funding indigent health
care. 131
CONCLUSION
Federal cutbacks and spiraling health costs have made Indiana's
Medicaid program leaner and more cost-effective. The state is dili-
gently working to remove abuse and overuse from the program, and
provide services at the most appropriate and least expensive level.
Services are available to recipients who need them; they are not avail-
able to recipients who overutilize services. Unfortunately, Indiana's re-
sponse to the Medicaid crisis imposes the increasing cost of Medicaid
upon the recipients. Often these individuals have little or no discre-
tionary income with which to pay medical bills and, hence, must
choose among food, rent, other necessary services, and health care.
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